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Introduction and Literature Review
This study is an investigation into student responses to moral dilemmas under
three different linguistic conditions. It follows on from work by Costa et. al (2014),
which found that people were more likely to make utilitarian decisions in their sec-
ond language than they were in their first. It also follows work on cognitive load
(Greene et. al. 2008) which has been found to have a varying effect on moral deci-
sion making. The work that this study builds on has been noteworthy because of the
counter-intuitive conclusions it reaches that moral decisions are affected by appar-
ently irrelevant factors such as the language in which a moral dilemma is posed, or
the simultaneous performance of mental tasks.
When researchers refer to utilitarian decisions, they are referring to the Western
philosophical ethical doctrine known as Utilitarianism first advocated by Bentham
(1795) who argued that correct moral actions are those which create the greatest
good for the greatest number. It is a consequentialist moral theory in that conse-
quences are ultimately the most important criteria for assessing a moral action. This
doctrine is often contrasted with deontological, or rights and duties, theories of mo-
rality, such as the view that people should always be regarded as an end rather than
as a means (Kant, 1785).
One famous philosophical thought experiment that well highlights the differ-
ence between utilitarian and deontological moral decisions is the trolley problem.
The trolley problem is a classic philosophical thought experiment originally con-
ceived by Foot (1967) in which she imagined the moral dilemma of the driver of a
runaway tram whose vehicle would hit and kill five workmen unless he steered onto
a different track on which a single workman was standing. Thomas (1982) refined
this problem using two scenarios which she called the bystander at the switch, and
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another that has become known as the footbridge. In the first scenario, we are to
imagine that a trolleybus will hit and kill five workmen unless it is diverted onto a
track occupied by a single worker, but that the driver of the trolleybus is incapaci-
tated, and it falls to a bystander to pull a lever which can divert the trolleybus. Re-
spondents are to imagine that they are the bystander and are asked what they should
do. In the second scenario, only one track exists, and the trolleybus is about to pass
under a footbridge. On the other side of the footbridge are five workers and they
will be killed unless the trolleybus is halted. The respondent is asked to imagine
they are on the footbridge and standing next to the only thing large enough to stop
the trolleybus ― a large fat man ― who will die if toppled onto the tracks but
whose size will stop the trolleybus thus saving the five workers. In experimental
surveys, respondents tend to favour pulling the switch in the first scenario at a rate
of 80% as opposed to 20% who would not pull the switch (Greene, 2013) yet these
percentages are reversed in the second scenario (Cathcart, 2013). An important point
of caution is that most of the research into moral decision making has been carried
out in countries that Heinrich, Heine and Norenzayan, (2010) describe as WEIRD
(Western, educated, industrialised, rich, democratic). Gold et. al (2014), however,
discovered that whereas 80% of British respondents considered pulling the switch to
be the right action in the first scenario, less than half of Chinese respondents agreed.
Similarly, Costa et al (2014) found that Korean respondents were far more reluctant
to push the fat man than were their Western counterparts.
When asked to explain their decisions, respondents typically justify pulling the
switch as saving “five lives instead of one” (Sandel, 2009). However, the trolley
problem reveals an apparent discrepancy in moral judgment as the second scenario
shows a strong preference for non-utilitarian moral decision making because for
many respondents, the idea of physically pushing a man off a bridge overrides the
ethical calculation of saving five instead of one. Respondents report a strong aver-
sion to pushing the fat man, suggesting that this action is more emotionally charged
than pulling a switch. Experimental psychology has sought to explain the discrep-
ancy in utilitarian judgment between the switch and the footbridge scenarios.
In recent years a large body of research has shown that human beings have
dual cognitive processes in which a fast, intuitive and emotional mode of thinking
competes with a slower, more deliberative and rational mode of thinking (Kahne-
man, 2011). Haidt (2012) argues that most moral judgments are made intuitively,
and rationalized post-hoc by the deliberative mode of thinking. Greene (2013), rely-
ing on a number of studies including those of brain-imaging, argues that utilitarian
judgment is more often a product of deliberative thought processes, whereas non-
utilitarian judgments tend to be produced by emotional cognitive processes. Costa
et. al. (2014) point out that while the use of a second language may be cognitively
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expensive and therefore may predict a decrease in utilitarian judgment, in fact the
reverse was observed, and that in their sample of respondents a greater number
opted for utilitarian judgments when moral problems were posed to them in their
second language. They argue that this is because second languages are less emotion-
ally evocative than the first language, thus reducing the affective resonance of the
footbridge scenario. They tested for and ruled out other possible explanations such
as that of language comprehension issues leading to random responses and a conse-
quent rise in the proportion towards 50%. A cultural explanation was also consid-
ered given that students of a second language may be exposed to cultural norms of
the language used outside that of their own culture. However, respondents were
found to answer the first scenario at almost exactly the same rate regardless of the
language used.
In this study while we agree that second language may reduce the emotional
impact of moral dilemmas and thus influencing decision making, such language ef-
fects may not be exclusive to second languages (L2) but may also appear when re-
spondents are analysing their first language. It has been observed that a focus on
form can lead to a lack of attention to meaning and a subsequent emotional detach-
ment to what is being expressed. A famous recorded conversation between a mother
and child (MacNeill, 1966) illustrates a prioritisation of grammatical error correction
by the mother at the expense of what the child is saying:
Child: Nobody don’t like me.
Mother: No, say “nobody likes me.”
Child: Nobody don’t like me. [eight repetitions of this exchange]
Mother: No, now listen carefully; say “nobody likes me.”
Child: Oh! Nobody don’t likes me.
It is here proposed that attention to grammatical errors in a person’s first lan-
guage will produce a similar increase in utilitarian decision making to that of second
language use with the possibility that the same processes are occurring, namely that
the processing of moral dilemmas in a second language involves a cognitive load ef-
fect. Therefore, the two hypotheses being proposed here are 1) that the findings of
Costa et al (2014) and others will be replicated here, that of the existence of a sec-
ond language effect; and 2) that a similar effect will be found in tests in respon-
dents’ first language which include a cognitive load of form-based error correction.
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Methodology
Participants
Data was collected from male and female Japanese students of two private uni-
versities in Japan (n＝183), aged between 18 and 21. Participants were all registered
in the authors’ classes, hence this is an example of convenience sampling (Dörnyei,
2007). The students were informed that participation was entirely voluntary and that
non-participation would have no effect on their grade. The students were all enrolled
in classes of English as a foreign language (three classes in each university).
Procedure and materials
Two trolley scenarios, the switch (scenario 1) and the footbridge (scenario 2),
were written in English and then translated into Japanese. Native speakers of Japa-
nese and English with proficiency in both languages were consulted and they judged
the wording to be equivalent in meaning. In a further step, a second version of sce-
nario 2 in L1 was created by inserting lexical and grammatical errors into the text.
In this latter version, a Japanese native speaker accepted that the text featured no-
ticeable errors of form, while retaining the meaning.
Each of the three classes in the two universities were assigned the following re-
search conditions. Group 1 were given the two scenarios in their first language,
Group 2 were presented the two scenarios in the foreign language that they are
studying (English), and Group 3 were the treatment group with the error-ridden sce-
nario 2. In one university, each of the groups was presented with each of the scenar-
ios using Google forms, which they answered using their smartphones during lesson
time. In this case, Group 3 were not instructed to make any error corrections (Group
3A). In the second university, Groups 1 and 2 were presented the problems in the
same way but Group 3 were shown the problems on paper and asked to correct the
errors by hand (Group 3B). All groups were asked to answer the two dilemmas; in
the first dilemma the choice was to pull the switch or not pull the switch and in the
second dilemma whether to push the fat man or not push the fat man. In the L2
condition, students were asked about their comprehension. Students who reported
understanding less than 50% were removed from the study.
The data was then collated into a spreadsheet, after which comparisons were
made of the results, according to the language used and whether or not errors were
present in the text. The three treatment groups were compared according to what
proportion of respondents made utilitarian decisions. Independent variable ANOVA
and t-tests were then conducted to establish the significance of the differences be-
tween these three groups (Dörnyei, 2007).
Nicholas MUSTY, Robert ANDREWS６２
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3A Group 3B
% Utilitarian Decisions Scenario 1 % Utilitarian Decisions Scenario 2 
Results
In the L1 group (N＝57), 58% opted to pull the switch in scenario 1 while
16% chose to push the fat man in scenario 2. In the L2 group (N＝61), 66% de-
cided to pull the switch while 36% chose to push the fat man. In the second instan-
tiation of the error correction group (Group 3B), only nine participants actually cor-
rected the errors, with the remaining respondents ignoring this requirement. There-
fore, the latter respondents were included with those who completed the Google
forms document with errors in scenario 2 (Group 3A), making a sample of 50. In
Group 3A, 54% opted to pull the switch, and 26% decided to push the fat man,
whereas in Group 3B 56% chose to pull the switch and 33% decided to push the fat
man. The results are displayed in full in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows the L2 group reported the highest number of utilitarian deci-
sions in the less emotional scenario 1. However, a t-test revealed that the variation
is insignificant to p＜0.05 which suggests that the treatment groups are comparable
to the (L1) control group.
Figure 1 also shows that, in comparison to scenario 1 a far lower number of
utilitarian choices were made in scenario 2 across all groups. It also suggests an in-
Figure 1 Percentage of respondents making utilitarian choices in scenario 1, by group
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creasing number of participants chose to make utilitarian decisions, as the cognitive
demands increased. When comparing the L1 and L2 (no error) treatment groups
with an independent samples t-test, there was a significant difference between the
responses of learners to moral dilemmas, according to whether L1 (M＝1.84, SD
＝.37) or L2 (M＝1.64, SD＝0.48) is used (t＝2.55, p＜.05). However, the differ-
ence between Groups 3A and 3B was not significant. The small number of respon-
dents in Group 3B creates problems of analysis which, among other things, will be
discussed in the following section.
Discussion
The two hypotheses to be tested in this study were that 1) Japanese respondents
would make utilitarian decisions to a greater degree when using L2 than when using
L1, and 2) that the cognitive load of correcting errors in L1 would also result in a
greater proportion of utilitarian decisions. As can be clearly seen in Figure 1, the
study supports both hypotheses to a varying degree. In the case of the first hypothe-
sis, there was a striking increase in the proportion of respondents who opted for a
utilitarian decision ― 36% in L2 compared with only 16% in L1. This supports pre-
vious studies by Costa et. al (2014) that there is a foreign language effect in in-
creased utilitarian judgment and Nakamura’s (2015) finding that this is also true for
Japanese respondents. Regarding the second hypothesis, the support is less emphatic.
Students did make more utilitarian judgments in scenario 2 when it was presented
with errors, which the students did not correct. However, the effect size was smaller
than that of the L2 group. When students corrected the errors, the effect appears to
increase ― from 16% to 31%, as opposed to 26% when the errors were not cor-
rected. This appears to suggest that a greater proportion of respondents make utili-
tarian judgments when participants are more involved in error correction and thus
that cognitive load has an effect. However, the small sample size of only nine par-
ticipants renders it as lacking in significance.
Regarding cultural differences in moral decision making between citizens of
East Asian and WEIRD countries, it is noticeable that this study replicated previous
studies’ findings that people from East Asian cultures were more reluctant to make
utilitarian decisions. The respondents to the present study, who are Japanese, were
less likely to make utilitarian decisions in both scenarios than the Spanish and Eng-
lish groups which participated in Costa et. al’s (2014) second experiment. When the
test was conducted in L1, only 56% of Japanese participants in the present study
opted to pull the switch in scenario 1, in comparison with 80% of the Spanish and
English language respondents to Costa et al’s study, regardless of the language used.
The present study is somewhat closer to the results of Gold et. al.’s (2014) finding
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that only 49% of Chinese respondents chose to pull the switch, and Costa et. al’s
(2014) observation that Korean respondents in scenario 2 were less likely than
Spanish and English language groups to push the fat man. While there was not the
extreme reluctance of 0% and 7.5% among Korean respondents under the respective
conditions of L1 and L2 that Costa et. al (2014) found, the levels of 16% and 36%
in Japanese speakers were generally lower than most of Costa et. al.’s (2014)
WEIRD groups. However, the results do appear to show that Japanese participants
are somewhat closer to WEIRD cultures than the other East Asian participants dis-
cussed so far, i.e. the Chinese and Korean respondents. Haidt (2012) has speculated
that a Confucian style of thinking that is less individualistic than in WEIRD coun-
tries may be responsible for a less utilitarian moral outlook. An alternative explana-
tion is that respondents may be less willing to involve themselves in train-related
moral dilemmas. Suicide rates are high in both Japan and the Republic of Korea
(World Health Organization, 2017), with many people jumping to their deaths on
railways every year, possibly leading to a greater aversion to countenancing throw-
ing someone onto a train line even in the interests of the “greater good”. These
points of cultural difference are raised here as possible explanatory factors for the
foreign language effect, which has been consistently found across several studies
such as this one.
Limitations of the present study
Although the results were generally consistent with the hypotheses, the small
sample size of Group 3B prevents the possibility of drawing strong conclusions
from the data. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that other limiting factors
may have had an adverse effect on the results. The trolley problem dilemma may be
well-known to students which highlights a risk that students may have already an-
swers to these dilemmas prior to participating in this study. In future studies, re-
spondents could be asked if they are familiar with the trolley problem with those
who respond affirmatively being removed from the results. As Nakamura (2015) has
suggested, future research should include moral dilemmas other than the switch and
footbridge problems. Finally, as with any study that uses a sample with a narrow
demographic range (university students), the results would not necessarily apply to
the Japanese population as a whole.
Despite these problems, the results could be of significance to language instruc-
tors in Japanese universities. The results have a number of implications for activities
that university students may engage in. As an example, student participation in
Model United Nations simulations is increasing (Engel et al, 2017) and these results
suggest that student representatives may be more inclined to opt for utilitarian solu-
tions in settings in which a foreign language is used. Anecdotally, teachers have
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sometimes been made aware of the problems of simultaneously monitoring student
output for meaning and form (Lightbown & Spada, 2006). One of the authors of the
present paper can personally recall marking an elementary student’s diary entry
“Very nice!” because the sentences were grammatically well-constructed, and cor-
rectly spelled, only to notice on re-reading that she had been writing about an injury
she had picked up while playing sports and thus making the comment inappropriate.
This study adds to the argument that teachers and students may need to become
aware of the dual processes of thinking fast and slow when assessing student output,
and also not to overburden students by expecting them to assess their peers for
grammatical accuracy and meaningful content in their written compositions. Were
this study to be replicated, some procedural changes may offer the opportunity to
optimise it. Firstly, more explicit instruction could have led to more uptake of the
error correction activity in the Group 3B. To further improve the impact of this
study, a procedure which involves some kind of simultaneous response to the moral
dilemma during the error correction stage may be required because it is difficult to
determine the method by which respondents answered the second scenario, such as
whether they focused more on the errors or the dilemma itself. Finally, in one of the
universities, on completion of the survey, students were asked to comment on the
trolley problem for homework. A qualitative analysis of these responses could offer
further insight into using the trolley problem in future.
Conclusion
This paper, which seeks to investigate two hypotheses into the effect of lan-
guage processing on moral decision-making, has implications for educators of sec-
ond language teaching. Firstly, the replication of previous studies (e.g Costa et al.,
2014; Nakamura, 2015) which have found a second-language effect on moral deci-
sion making was demonstrated by the results in this study which showed that Japa-
nese students made utilitarian judgments to a greater degree when moral dilemmas
were presented to them in English than did so when presented in Japanese. It has
been argued that such results demonstrate a tendency to use the rational, or delibera-
tive mode of cognition when using a second language. The implication that this has
for language instructors is that students may be more prepared to make rational, de-
liberative choices in class activities such as debates or simulations such as Model
UN. It would also appear that cultural factors are in force, with Japanese respon-
dents tending to be more utilitarian in their approach than their East Asian neigh-
bours, although not to the extent of those in the West. Secondly, the finding that
many respondents opted for utilitarian judgments when faced with the cognitive load
of error correction suggests that a similar effect can be produced in first-language
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decision-making as well. In this case, the implication may be to caution language
teachers to separate form-focused error correction from meaningful error correction
either when the language instructor is evaluating student work, or when setting peer-
editing instructions. It needs to be emphasized, however, that the results of the sec-
ond hypothesis are far less robust than those of the first, and suggests further re-
search is necessary with more rigorous testing. In particular, a larger sample would
offer greater clarity on the effects of increased cognitive demands in L1 as well as
L2 on moral decision making.
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Appendix 1
Description of scenarios as provided to participants (L1)
問題 1
問題を読んで、選択をしてください。間違った答えはありません。
運転手がいないトロッコは線路を走っています。このままでは前方で作業中の 5人がトロッコに轢かれ
てしまいます。遠過ぎるからあなたが声かけても作業中の 5人には聞こえません。このときあなたは、
線路の分岐器の近くにいました。あなたが分岐器のレバーを引き、トロッコの進路を切り替えれば 5人
は助かります。しかし、別路線にも 1人作業員がいるため、代わりにその人が轢かれてしまいます。レ
バーを引いたら、1人亡くなります。レバーを引かなかったら、5人亡くなります。あなたならどうし
ますか？
□ レバーを引きます
□ レバーを引きません
問題 2
運転手がいないトロッコは線路を走っています。このままでは前方で作業中の 5人がトロッコに轢かれ
てしまいます。遠過ぎるからあなたが声かけても作業中の 5人には聞こえません。このときあなたは、
線路の上にある橋にいます。近くに太い男の人がいます。もし彼が線路に落ちたら、トロッコは停ま
り、5人は助かります。しかし、あなたがその男の人を突き落としたら、代わりにかれが轢かれてしま
います。もしあなたが太い男の人を突き落としたら、1人亡くなります。もしあなたが太い男の人を突
き落とさなければ、5人亡くなります。あなたならどうしますか？
□ 太い男の人を突き落とします
□ 太い男の人を突き落としません
Appendix 2
Description of scenario 2 as provided to participants in Group 3, containing errors
運転手がないトロッコは線路に走っています。このままでは前方で作業中の 5人がトロッコに轢かれる
しまいます。遠過ぎるからあなたが声かけてもさぎょうちゅの 5人には聞きません。このときあなた
は、線路の上にある橋にいます。近くに太い男の人はいます。もし彼が線路に落ちたら、トロッコは停
まり、5人は助ります。しかし、あなたがその男の人を押したら、代わりにかれが轢かれてしまいます。
もしあなたが太い男の人を突き落としたら、1人無くなります。もしあなたが太い男の人を突き落とさ
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ない、5人亡くなります。あなたならどうしますか？
Appendix 3
Description of scenarios as provided to participants (L2)
Problem 1
A trolley car with no driver is speeding down a track. At the end of the track, five workers are busy doing con-
struction work. They will be killed if the trolley hits them. You cannot shout and warn them because they are
too far from you. You are standing next to a lever which, if pulled, will send the trolley onto another track and
save the five workers. However, there is one worker on the other track who will be killed if you pull the lever.
If you pull the lever, one person will die. If you don’t pull the lever, five people will die. What should you do?
□ Pull the lever
□ Don’t pull the lever
Problem 2
A trolley car with no driver is speeding down a track. At the end of the track, five workers are busy doing con-
struction work. They will be killed if the trolley hits them. You cannot shout and warn them because they are
too far from you. You are standing on a footbridge above the track, and a fat man is leaning over the edge. He
is big enough to stop the train if he is pushed onto the track which will save the workers. But, if you push the
man off the bridge, he will be killed. If you push the fat man, one person will die. If you don’t push the fat
man, five people will die. What should you do?
□ Push the man
□ Don’t push the man
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